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Abstract This article provides foundations to Polanyi’s famed argument that
monopoly power in the global capital market served as an instrument of peace dur-
ing the Pax Britannica ~1815–1914!+ Our perspective is novel—we focus on the role
of intermediaries and certification+ We show that when information and enforcement
are imperfect, there is scope for the endogenous emergence of “prestigious” inter-
mediaries who enjoy a monopoly position and as a result, control government actions+
They can implement conditional lending: they subject the distribution of credit to the
adoption of peaceful policies+ Prestigious intermediaries act that way because of their
concern with maintaining an unblemished track record when wars increased risks of
default+ Our analysis, which brings together insights from different disciplines, pro-
vides a significant extension to, and departure from, recent research on how coun-
tries accumulate reputational capital+
In the pantheon of international political economy ~IPE!, Karl Polanyi’s Great
Transformation occupies a central position+ His famed conjecture that financiers
were responsible for the “Hundred Years Peace” between the Congress of Vienna
~1815! and the Austrian Archduke Franz-Ferdinand’s assassination in Sarajevo
~1914! provides an early recognition of the interrelations between economics and
politics+ Polanyi claimed that peace was the result of conscious actions by a sub-
group of financiers, which he called “Haute Finance” and within which the House
of Rothschild reigned supreme, “embodying the principle of abstract internation-
alism” ~whatever is meant by that beautiful phrase!+ As he argued:
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The nineteenth century produced a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of
Western civilization, namely a hundred years’ peace—1815–1914+Apart from
the Crimean War—a more or less colonial event—England, France, Prussia,
Austria and Italy were engaged in war among each other for altogether only
eighteen months+ + + + This triumph of a pragmatic pacifism was certainly not
the result of an absence of grave causes for conflict + + + The entirely new fac-
tor, we submit, was the emergence of an acute peace interest+ Traditionally,
such an interest was regarded as outside the scope of the state system+ + + + For
an explanation of this amazing feat, we must seek for some undisclosed pow-
erful social instrumentality at work in the new setting, which could play the
role of dynasties and episcopacies under the old and make the peace interest
effective+ This anonymous factor was Haute Finance+1
In Polanyi’s account, Haute Finance’s desire and ability to use market power to
influence policies toward peace did the trick: Haute Finance secured peace through
a mechanism that anticipated what is known today as “political conditionality+”
But Polanyi’s bottom line was postulated rather than demonstrated: he provided
neither empirical nor theoretical foundations to explain how Haute Finance became
the “anonymous factor” of a successful attempt at preventing wars+ Nor did he
document the actual success or track record+ He recognized that “no all-around
inquiry of the nature of international banking in the nineteenth century has yet
been undertaken” and directed readers to the work of historians Corti, Jenks, and
Feis, from which he said he had gleaned insights—although the first book is a
largely hagiographic account of the House of Rothschild, and the last two quite a
distance from Polanyi’s theme+2 The precise reason why Haute Finance could be
enlisted in the interest of peace remains obscure except when Polanyi features as
a functionalist, briefly alluding to the notion that providing peace ~an international
public good! would have legitimized the power of Haute Finance+3
Do we know that the marketplace discriminated against wars during the nine-
teenth century? Could it actually lead governments to be discouraged from mili-
tary undertakings? Why should financiers want peace? Tilly has argued that, in
early modern Europe, states made war and wars made states and financiers ben-
efited+4 Historians have shown that Ouvrard ~Napoleon’s financier! and Bleichröder
~Bismarck’s! enriched themselves from funding conflicts+5 Polanyi certainly did
1+ Polanyi 1944, 5, 7, 9+
2+ Compare Jenks 1927; Corti 1928; and Feis 1930 with Polanyi 1944, 9–10+
3+ “Haute Finance was not designed as an instrument of peace; this function fell to it by acci-
dent+ + + + @Haute Finance# was able to serve a new interest, which had no specific organ of its own; for
the service of which no other institution happened to be available, and which was nevertheless of vital
importance to the community: namely, peace+” Polanyi 1944, 11–12+ A bridge may be built between
this perspective and Cashore 2002, who studies ~in a different context! the emergence of nonstate
market-driven governance systems and the conditions under which they gain authority to create policy+
The perspective we articulate here is distinct, though not necessarily exclusive+
4+ Tilly 1992+
5+ On Ouvrard, see Wolff 1992; on Bismarck, see Stern 1977+
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not argue that an amorphous financial interest acted in an uncoordinated way to
discourage war+ Rather, he emphasized that a highly cohesive grouping, whose
epicenter he identifies with the House of Rothschild, was in charge of implement-
ing political conditionality+ But is such a description adequate? Was Haute Finance
actually behaving in a cartel-like manner, and why? We provide new data and
new theoretical foundations to Polanyi’s conjecture, and thereby also provide some
important qualifications and insights into the relation between financial market
power and international relations+
It is a widespread notion that financiers have “dictatorial” powers+ Think for
instance of Friedman’s claim that there are two superpowers: “the United States
and Moody’s Investors Services+”6 This view has deep historical roots+When Pola-
nyi wrote his book, he could rely on a long tradition that emphasized the exis-
tence of a “capital market conspiracy+” The late nineteenth century saw the rise of
a literature that personified ~and vilified! the capital market+An overarching theme
was that global finance acted as a cartel and reference to the Rothschilds’ central-
ity in the “plot” abound+7 Denouncing the existence of “money trusts” became
popular+8 Such accounts, generally associated with Hobson’s 1902 theory of impe-
rialism,9 eventually found their way into the works of Marxist students, such as
Rudolf Hilferding and Vladimir Lenin+ They argued that, given the power of Haute
Finance, the occurrence of World War I was proof that Finance had wanted war
~in a sin of omission, it did not work to prevent war!+10 The notion and language of
bankers’ influence was resurrected by post–World War I historians and then back
into Polanyi—although unlike the case for Hobson and his followers, the Roth-
schilds were now praised as friends of peace+11 With the revival of global markets
and market management of reputation, this tradition is currently making a come-
back+ Modern IPE scholars working on investment banks, sovereign funds, or rat-
6+ Interview with Thomas L+ Friedman, broadcast on “The News Hour with Jim Lehrer,” PBS
Television, 13 February 1996+ Transcript available at ^http:00www+pbs+org0newshour0gergen0
friedman+html&+ Accessed 2 November 2011+
7+ According to Jenks, Walther Lotz was among the first to describe the bond market as “mono-
polescent+” See Lotz 1890; and Jenks 1927+
8+ In 1908, “Lysis” achieved worldwide celebrity by publishing a blockbuster pamphlet ~Against
Financial Oligarchy! in which he charged that international banks were a cartelized oligarchy that
held borrowing governments hostage in “game preserves” that were “jealously defended”: “Trespass-
ers are asked to walk away+ One cannot do business with a foreign government without asking the
authorization of the landlord+” Lysis 1908, 105+ On Lysis, see Beale 1999; and Berger 2003+ Justice
Louis Brandeis uses similar language as Lysis to depict the operation of the “Money Trust” in the
United States+ Brandeis 1913, chap+ 1+
9+ John Hobson’s theory of imperialism contains one of the most famous and explicit statements
to this effect, suggesting that the House of Rothschild had the power to stand in the way of wars and
was therefore guilty of the sin of omission for all the conflicts that nonetheless occurred+ In Hobson’s
words: “Does anyone seriously suppose that a great war could be undertaken by any European State,
or a great State loan subscribed, if the house of Rothschild and its connections set their face against
it?” Hobson’s suspicion of a bankers’ conspiracy also reflected his professed anti-Semitism+ Hobson
1902, 64+
10+ See Hilferding 1910; and Lenin 1916, chap+ 3+
11+ See Jenks 1927; and Feis 1930+
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ing agencies, recognize that such players, because they “control” the reputation of
borrowers, wield considerable power, motivating study of their ideologies, beliefs,
and policies+12
Yet Polanyi’s and others’ personification of financial markets is not methodolog-
ically straightforward+ To be valid, personification requires proof that a certain
group of agents is willing and able to act in a cartel or at least in a group-like
manner so that it can be represented by a collective ~rational! self+ However, fol-
lowing Olson, modern scholars have been skeptical of such collusion’s capacity to
survive+ Schultz and Weingast extend this skepticism to capital markets and cast
doubt on the likelihood of successful credit embargoes in the wake of rampant
free riding+13 Theoretical economists point out that lending to sovereigns is plagued
by a “common agency” problem ~several lenders deal with one borrower, which
creates an externality in both contracting and collective action!+14
Two books, published respectively by Kirshner and Tomz, have managed to do
away with the role of special intermediaries that was central in Polanyi and his
Marxist and populist predecessors+ While Kirshner and Tomz provide different
perspectives, both share the notion that lenders in the capital market are best
described as atomized, uncoordinated entities, leaving no room for the powerful
banking lobby of the Hundred Years Peace+15 Kirshner contends that finance wants
macroeconomic stability and therefore might inhibit some conflict+ Focusing on
domestic financiers’ attitudes and preferences regarding wars, he finds an appeas-
ing factor in bankers’ love for low inflation and policies designed to sustain it,
their taste for an economy’s ability to produce robust and predictable real interest
rates, and so on+ An appeasing bias thus appears because wars ~by making nom-
inal and real interest rates unpredictable! threaten to disrupt this favored environ-
ment+ This peaceful disposition, he concludes, is an important influence in
contemporary international relations and “will remain so, especially for as long
as financial globalization endures+”16 There is a seeming parallel between this
12+ On rating agencies, see Sinclair 1994 and 2005; on the IMF, see Chwieroth 2007a and 2007b;
on institutional investors see Harmes 1998 and 2001+ For perspectives on the recent evolution of market-
state relations relevant to the ideas developed here, see Helleiner 1994; Strange 1996; Pauly 1997; and
Mosley 2003+
13+ See Olson 1965; and Schultz and Weingast 2003+
14+ Early references include Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz 1986, and Bulow and Rogoff 1989, both
of whom are skeptical of creditors’ coordination+ Compare with Wright 2002 and 2005+
15+ This argument is passim in Tomz 2007+ It comes explicitly in italicized form in the theory
chapter entitled “Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy” when Tomz emphasizes that his theory
explains “lending and repayment even with completely atomized creditors” ~2007, 226, emphasis in
original!+ It is also a forceful theme of the chapter “Enforcement through Collective Retaliation,”
which holds that “the cohesion of creditors, so central in theories of sanctioning, has had remarkably
little effect on the behavior of borrowers and lenders” ~ibid+, 219!; this theme is emphasized in the
book’s pitch which refers to “atomized bond markets+” Available at ^http:00www+stanford+edu0;tomz0
pubs0Tomz-RIC+html&+ Accessed 12 October 2011+ Likewise, Kirshner 2007, 10, states: “Inter-
national financial markets reflect the cumulative sentiments of uncoordinated market actors+” For an
earlier work sharing similar emphasis, see Aggarwal 1989 and 1996+
16+ Kirshner 2007, 1+
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argument and Polanyi’s ~as Kirshner does recognize!+17 But Kirshner accounts
for the appeasing tendencies of bankers in a manner that rules out the instrumen-
tal role of certain actors—as incarnated in Polanyi’s claim about particular bank-
ers’ peacekeeping action+ Thus, Kirshner’s view of a powerful and diffuse market
antipathy against war can be seen as a post-Olsonian version of the Polanyi intu-
ition, one where the Rothschilds and Haute Finance are missing+18
Another important recent contribution that dwells on markets’ atomicity and
rules out large actors and intermediaries is Tomz’s study of reputation and market
access+ Using a historical perspective, he argues that lack of information about
countries’ types does align competitive and atomistic lenders’ behavior and incen-
tives+ While this setting is vulnerable to free riding, it nonetheless facilitates the
emergence of a certain form of discipline and permits government debt to emerge+
Countries with no credit history face bad terms because they scare lenders away+
They must then work hard and be patient and faithful so as to ~slowly! accumulate
reputational capital+ Tomz provides compelling nineteenth-century evidence that
new sovereign borrowers in foreign markets were penalized by high interest rates+
Seasoned ones ~with a good history and track record! were rewarded by lower
rates+ In this account there is no room for intermediaries+ Tomz’s very careful study
does not mention Polanyi ~either in the text, in the reference list, or in the index!—a
suggestion that modern rational choice theory might do away with Polanyi’s view
that market structure ~the “monopoly” of Haute Finance! mattered+
In contrast to these works, our article reconstructs Polanyi’s idea, highlighting
the role of intermediaries in the market for government debt+ Our study is one of
quality certification+ Polanyi’s conjecture amalgamates two complementary argu-
ments: a monopoly power argument and a political conditionality0peacekeeping
argument+ We give foundations to both by introducing insights from finance and
industrial organization theory, which hearken back to Michael Spence’s seminal
paper on the economics of signaling+19 The supply of certification services is non-
competitive+ Owing to credibility issues, certification tends to exhibit features of a
natural monopoly: because it earns revenues from issuing a label, a certifier can
benefit from misrepresenting the true condition of the government it assesses—
unless such misrepresentation leads to forgoing future revenue because of reputa-
tion loss+ For veracity to prevail in equilibrium, the costs of cheating ~as captured
by permanently diminished market share! therefore must exceed the benefits ~the
one-shot sale of misleading advice! obtained when certifiers own a large market
share to begin with, making deviation from truthful behavior painful+
For certification to be credible there must be a critical level of monopoly power—
this explains why Polanyi could portray the global capital market as noncompeti-
17+ Ibid+, 9+
18+ It also stands explicitly in contrast with Hobson’s insight that the “special interest of the financier”
was the source of “war, militarism, and a spirited foreign policy+” Kirshner 2007, 15+
19+ Spence 1973+
Bond Markets and International Relations During the Pax Britannica 215
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000070
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:20:15, subject to the Cambridge Core
tive+ As we find, the Rothschilds ~Polanyi’s main characters and core of the Haute
Finance “conspiracy”! had a very large market share and were thus concerned with
retaining prestige+ We give both an explicit rational foundation and supporting
data for this interpretation+
Next we explain why brand concerns lead prestigious bankers to distribute their
seal of approval with prudence and as a result, obstruct war+ Because the ability to
certify rests on reputation, a prestigious certifier tailors support to countries in a
way that maximizes its own prestige+ Since wars increase risks and ultimately make
default more likely, prestigious intermediaries seek to discourage conflict+ This
concern led prestigious bankers to set their face against those wars that were destruc-
tive of their future ability to certify+ This is why they sought to discourage coun-
tries from military entanglements—not because prestigious bankers were some
precursors of the UN or because this would look good on their vitae, but because
war would have meant forgoing future revenues+ We found evidence in the fact
that global financing for wars was not ruled out altogether but limited to conflicts
that did not threaten certifiers’ brands+ This new interpretation of pro-peace vir-
tues of banking elites provides a meaningful qualification to Polanyi+
The old trinity for culpability—means, motive, opportunity—provides a detec-
tion method+ Since Polanyi accused Haute Finance of having “killed” wars, we
must provide evidence that prestigious bankers had the means, the motive, and
the opportunity+ This would be enough for most judges and juries but some may
prefer a confession+ Using both archival and secondary sources, we have identi-
fied cases where the relation between war and finance was explicitly discussed
and, digging deeper, even found evidence of military conditionality in original
underwriting contracts ~which committed banks to provide funding in a stated
form and time!+ All this is new and powerful material in support of the prestige-
protection0war-prevention nexus that we argue was at the heart of the Pax
Britannica+
Because detailed studies seeking to unpack the links between IPE and security
issues are rare, our new perspective on Polanyi makes three contributions+ First,
we make an innovative theoretical advance by showing how insights from indus-
trial organization theory can be used in mainstream theory in international
relations and IPE+ Our argument explaining why political power can accrue spon-
taneously to private entities in situations of serious information asymmetries and
enforcement problems breaks new ground+ It shows that Olsonian skepticism regard-
ing cartels’ ability to survive may not be relevant when information is scant and
enforcement difficult—situations that are very relevant in the real world+ Like-
wise, our recognition of market structures’ role is a challenge to institutionalist views
on the role of constitutions and commitments ~a view currently associated with the
“democratic advantage”!+20 In other words, the import of insights from diverse fields
yields suggestive results and should provoke new interdisciplinary research+
20+ See, for example, North and Weingast 1989; and Schultz and Weingast 2003+
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Second, our study provides both a critique and broadening of Tomz’s analysis
of government policy’s role in securing reputation through repeat play+ We show
conditions under which it is profitable for the government not to wait until it has a
reputation of its own but instead, to use a private agent as an intermediary to secure
this reputation by proxy+ Although Tomz does not consider this possibility, we
show that it has empirical relevance+ The result is that the intermediary acquires a
form of “ownership” of government policies and can use it to secure certain pol-
icies ~thus the connection with war and peace, but obviously the issue has rele-
vance for government policies at large!+ Thinking of conditional lending resulting
from monopolistic lenders’ ownership of “property rights” over government rep-
utation provides a theoretical foundation for why government policy may be “cap-
tured” by market actors+ It also provides a theoretical explanation for why certain
policy beliefs, held by private actors, are important and deserve study+
Last, our study provides new insight and reliable data to discuss Polanyi’s claims+
For all the popularity Polanyi’s ideas have enjoyed, no such attempt has ever been
made+ The combination of this original data and theory also contributes to a better
understanding of the nineteenth century’s systems+ This is useful for political sci-
entists genuinely interested in the study of past regimes and makes historical com-
parisons more relevant+ While today’s world is no longer run by Haute Finance,
we still get the insight that alternative “credibility acquiring mechanisms” are for
borrowing governments like outside options for one another, suggesting that a theory
of imperfect competition in conditional lending has broad empirical relevance+
Was Polanyi Right? Stylized Facts About War and
Market Access
Significant anecdotal evidence has long been recognized to be on Polanyi’s side+
For instance, in 1859, a frustrated Italian leader Camillo Cavour reported on his
difficulty in raising external capital before waging a campaign against Austria:
“bankers of all countries,” he lamented, “have organized a kind of conspiracy in
favor of peace+”21 But to go beyond the level of anecdote, new data is relevant to
the question of whether capital markets discriminated against wars+ We rely on a
new, extensive data set of London security issues during the Hundred Years’ Peace
~1815–1913! that we hand-collected and matched against war data sets constructed
by others+22 Our main source for conflicts is Gleditsch, who provides an update of
the Correlates of War database; we rely on Reiter and Stam for information on
21+ Quoted in Gille 1967, 358 ~emphasis added!+
22+ For a description of this data set, see Flandreau et al+ 2010+ The data set was based on a variety
of sources—including Clarke 1878; Jenks 1927; and Fenn 1883—and then checked against announce-
ments in the press ~principally The Times of London!, as well as prospectuses, contracts, and archival
material+
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warring nations+23 The war data we employ coincides with what the Correlates of
War database defines as “Inter-States Wars” ~we added the U+S+ Civil War, consid-
ering the Secessionist Confederacy as a sovereign entity!+ We are interested in
foreign countries that managed to secure funding during wartime in the London
capital market+24 That is, to assess Polanyi’s claim that Haute Finance was biased
against war, we produce a statistical summary of foreign countries’ market access
in London, and then cluster it with evidence on their being at war+ The statistics
have been organized to correspond to the four boom-to-bust phases in foreign debt
lending in London: 1818–29, 1845–76, 1877–95, and 1896–1913+25
Table 1 reports the results that the Hundred Years’ Peace is a Western Euro-
pean, developed-countries phenomenon+ The exception is the period between 1845
and 1876, which displayed a number of “unification wars” ~wars between Germany’s
and Italy’s predecessor states on the one hand and Austria on the other, and the
Franco-Prussian War—the political prelude to German unification!+ Apart from
that, war was limited to the confines of Europe ~the Crimean War! or to the rest of
the world ~Latin America, Asia, and North America!+
When we combine this information with market access data, we obtain results
that are partly consistent with Polanyi+ For the entire period ~1818–1913!, we have
nineteen instances of capital market access by foreign countries that occurred dur-
ing wars, which is equivalent to 5 percent of 380 loans+ For the period 1845–
1913, which encompassed ten different wars, we find only sixteen market access
events in wartime; this is only 4+5 percent of the total number of loans+ Control-
ling for the fact that some wars received multi-access, we compute ~but do not
report in the table! that lending did occur during 19+6 percent of all wars+26 In
other words, war lending was not a big business in London ~which is consistent
with Polanyi’s notion of a market-place peacekeeping channel!, but securing war
finance was not altogether impossible, and references to automatic embargoes
require further scrutiny+
Polanyi reflected that not all wars were equivalent and dismissed the Crimean
war as a “more or less colonial event+” Without taking a stand on specific wars,
we agree that different wars had different significance depending on the belliger-
ents’ standing+ In the bottom panel of Table 1, we organize London wartime loans
in four categories+We distinguish: ~1!“wars between powers”—wars between mem-
bers of the “Concert of Europe”: Austria, Britain, France, Prussia0Germany, the
23+ See Gleditsch 2004; and Reiter and Stam 2002+
24+ We exclude countries that secured wartime funding in other international markets ~for example,
Amsterdam or Paris!+We also exclude funding in London of British wars ~for example, the Boer Wars!,
since London was a domestic market for the British government+ Moreover, London Stock Exchange
regulations prevented countries in war with Britain to secure funding in London+ Slaughter 1873+
25+ Only a few loans were made during the period 1829– 45, which would render any inferences
spurious+ As a result this period is ignored throughout the analysis, although the data is available from
the authors+
26+ The total number of wars for the period 1845–1913 was fifty-one, with lending occurring in ten,
or 19+6 percent+
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Russian Empire, to which we add the Kingdom of Sardinia0Italy;27 ~2! “wars
involving powers” ~where at least one power was involved but they did not fight
one another!; ~3! “colonial wars” ~all that the name implies!; and ~4! “others” ~a
residual category that includes the few wars between countries outside the nations
mentioned, such as conflicts between Latin American nations!+
The category “wars between powers” is expected to have more significance in
terms of geopolitical stability and should be more rationed than the other types of
war+ To see whether this pattern obtains, Table 1 clusters market-access events
according to war types+28 With only three exceptions ~the 1854 and 1855 Crimean
War loans to Turkey and a 1870 Franco-Prussian War loan to France!, wars between
27+ Incidentally, applying this criterion makes the Crimean war, in which Britain and France, along-
side the Ottoman Empire, fought Russia, not a “colonial event” ~as Polanyi’s suggested! but a “war
between powers+”
28+ We consider the market access event according to war type, not borrower type+ In this logic,
Ottoman borrowing during the Crimean War is a loan for a war between powers, because Britain and
France were actively supporting the Turks against Russia+
TABLE 1. War and capital during the Hundred Years’ Peace
Period 1818–29 1845–76 1877–95 1896–1913
War statistics
Share of years with war in at least one country 66+7% 96+9% 73+7% 88+9%
Number of wars
Between powers 0 5 0 0
Powers vs. nonpowers 3 10 13 4
Other wars 3 11 4 9
Total number of wars 6 21 17 13
Foreign issues statistics
Foreign issues:
Total number1 22 148 107 103
Per year 1+8 4+6 5+6 5+7
Issues by foreign countries at war
Number of issues by foreign countries at war2 3 7 4 5
Between foreign powers 0 3 0 0
Involving foreign powers 0 0 1 4
Colonial wars3 0 0 3 0
Other wars 3 4 0 1
Number of issues from countries not at war 19 141 103 97
Share of war loans 14% 5% 4% 5%
Notes: 1+ Outright foreign issues on the London market ~no conversions!+ Foreign powers include Austria, France,
Germany0Prussia, Italy, and Russia; Japan is not treated as a power+ See text for description of sources for loans+
2+ From Gleditsch 2004, who revises the Correlates of War database+ We focus on so-called interstate wars ~ibid+,
Tab+ A, 248– 49!+ Loans from “war countries” are those issued during wartime+ We exclude issues that are issued
before or after wars as well as indemnity loans ~that is, French 1871–72 loans!+
3+ Colonial wars are those involving foreign powers or countries in a colonial conquest+
Source: Author calculations from a variety of sources+
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powers never led to international loans in London+ International finance abstained
from funding the German and Italian unification wars, justifying Cavour’s con-
cern that his political efforts were obstructed by bankers+
As Table 1 shows, the bulk of war loans concentrated on other types of con-
flicts+ There were only two “wars involving powers” during which the London
capital market was used: the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 ~for one loan! and
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 ~for a total of five loans!+ There were also two
colonial wars during which the “colonized” country received funding from Lon-
don ~China against France in 1885 and China against Japan in 1894–95! for a
total of three loans+ Four other wars involved five loans from London: the Argentina-
Brazil-Uruguay skirmish of 1852, the Triple Alliance War against Paraguay of 1865–
70, the U+S+ Civil War, and the second Balkan War+ Our findings thus both vindicate
Polanyi’s hypothesis and qualify it+ That certain types of wars were penalized is
not consistent with Polanyi’s interpretation of financiers providing a public good+
Had they been a peacekeeping body they ought to have been willing to prevent all
wars+ They did not+
The Argument: Prestige as Gatekeeping
Economics of Prestige
Our explanation of how and why markets discriminated against certain wars is an
argument about the role of prestige in certification+ It has roots in industrial orga-
nization and financial economics research that has explored conditions under which
markets can solve problems involving incentives to report truthfully+ For simplic-
ity, consider a world in which there are two types of investors ~informed and
uninformed! and two types of governments ~good and bad!+ As in the respective
works of Kirshner and Tomz, ordinary investors suffer from information asymme-
tries+ Assume, for example, that such investors—unlike informed intermediaries
~underwriting banks!—cannot distinguish the relative merits of borrowing govern-
ments+ Intermediaries have incentives to cheat investors because they earn fees,
but investors understand that+
As we argued in earlier, related work, one possible solution of such a setting is
an arrangement where bankers are sorted into a pyramid of prestige ~the less numer-
ous, more prestigious bankers are at the top! and association of a given loan with
prestigious bankers sends a quality signal+29 The reason is that security underwrit-
ers’ reputation for veracity helps them secure a large market share+ This mitigates
the moral hazard problem in the production of information+ Prestigious intermedi-
aries who might otherwise be tempted to overprice securities ~to generate short-
term gains! are held back by their very prestige: if they lose it, they will damage
29+ See Flandreau and Flores 2009 and forthcoming+ The modern theory of signaling was pioneered
by Spence 1973+ He showed how efforts could be used to signal a potential employee’s worth+
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future revenues+30 An important theme in economic models resting on such ideas
is that market share emerges as the endogenous solution to problems involving
precommitment or credibility+ A few prestigious bankers have monopoly power
and specialize in high-grade securities, while the many ordinary underwriters are
competitive and deal mostly with low-grade securities ~they have a narrower mar-
ket, plagued with rampant quality problems!+
While the recent “subprime” crisis ~a major gatekeeping failure! has cast doubt
on the validity of related arguments in modern markets, our earlier work on for-
eign debt found substantial support+ During the first foreign debt boom of the nine-
teenth century, when the London market for foreign debt was started, the House
of Rothschild surpassed all other underwriters in terms of market share, capital
stock, and performance+ This is consistent with our notion that prestige was used
for the successful origination and distribution of high-quality ~“investment grade”!
government securities+
Prestige Meets International Relations
The Rothschilds’ large market provided them with incentives for being reliable+31
The House of Rothschild consistently held the top position in the “league tables”
of foreign government debt+ And to retain this leadership, a prestigious originator
ought to issue successful securities+ Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto-Parrà
show that the Rothschilds did outperform competitors on this score throughout
the entire Hundred Years’ Peace+32
The only other bank that featured in the top three ~in three subperiods out of
four! is the House of Baring, which historians reckon was the other prestigious
house+33 Unsurprisingly, during the entire period, the market remained
concentrated—market shares for the top three loan originators were always above
50 percent+ Computation of so-called Herfindhal-Hirschmann Indices ~HHI! ~which
capture the degree of concentration! support this: indices range from concentrated
to very concentrated according to conventionally accepted thresholds+34 There-
fore, the degree of concentration and persistence was remarkable and confirms
30+ See Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994 for a model+ Empirical studies include Megginson and Weiss
1991; and Carter and Manaster 1990 on the role of reputation in initial public offerings+ Carter, Dark,
and Singh 1998 find that issues managed by prestigious houses outperform those managed by ordinary
ones; Beatty and Ritter 1986 test for the proposition that originators whose issues underperform lose
market share+
31+ See Flandreau et al+ 2010 for details+
32+ See ibid+; and Flandreau and Flores forthcoming+
33+ See Hidy 1949; Chapman 1984; and Ziegler 1988+
34+ HHI are as follows ~we omit the period 1825– 45: there were almost no issues, and most of the
few that took place were conversions!: 1818–25: 2,432; 1845–76: 1,382; 1877–95: 2,176; 1896–1913:
1,196+ It is conventionally reckoned ~for example, for regulatory purposes! that markets in which the
HHI is below 1,000 are fully competitive, those between 1,000 and 1,800 points are concentrated, and
those in which the HHI is in excess of 1,800 points are highly concentrated+
Bond Markets and International Relations During the Pax Britannica 221
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000070
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:20:15, subject to the Cambridge Core
our view of an equilibrium outcome with market leadership reinforcing, and being
reinforced by, prestige+
In short, prestige was a strategic investment ~sunk cost! that created a barrier to
entry against other banks+ The sunk cost provided a kind of monopoly power that
did not rest on standard cartelization ~that is, a mere agreement between market
participants! and was thus not subject to free riding, contrary to the conventional
concern of Olson and others+ For instance, our characterization differs from the
Marxist interpretation of Polanyi’s Haute Finance as some kind of “gang+” The Roth-
schilds were special not because they were the “boss” of a cartel but because they
differentiated themselves from all the other issuers through quality signals+ The
bankers’ name was a prestige good—something which Polanyi ~as a precursor of
economic anthropology! might have appreciated—but he did not articulate it+
Our interpretation of monopoly power stemming not from cartelization but from
prestige is novel+35 In standard models, bondholders’ attempts to coerce defaulters
are hampered by the bondholders having their money tied with the defaulters ~thus
creating a conflict of interest and time inconsistency!+ But delegation of enforce-
ment to a prestigious underwriter does not present this flaw+ Once a loan has been
issued, the investors rather than the prestigious bankers bear the cost of default+
Since bankers have already disposed of the loan, they mostly worry about their
ability to certify future loans which rests in part on wise ex ante choices but even
more so on successful ex post trouble-shooting+ For this, they do not hesitate to
use credit embargoes+ In other words, prestigious bankers can credibly precommit
to punish defaulters in the future ~because punishing defaulters is really polishing
the bankers’ shield!+36
For this reason the prestigious bank has a valuable role to play+ When a bor-
rower’s reputation can rise and fall, certification by prestigious houses ~whose mar-
ket share and prestige is stable! provides a dependable anchor+ One obvious situation
when a country lacks credibility is when it is new in the market+ At a broader
level, however, the need for a reputable underwriter can arise each time a country
undergoes some “information crisis+” A fiscal crisis is one possibility+ The pros-
pect or outbreak of a war ~with its dire fiscal, political, and diplomatic complica-
tions! is another+ Economists have shown abundantly that wars were historically a
major source of deficit+37 This means that the certification power of prestigious
intermediaries becomes extremely valuable during diplomatic crises and military
conflicts+
That wars increase information asymmetries and thus increase the value of pres-
tige is one thing+ But what prevents prestige from sponsoring a war? The invisible
35+ The importance of underwriter prestige has been neglected in recent research+ Exceptions include
business history+ See Gille 1965 and 1967; Roberts 1992; and Suzuki 1994+ In political science, the
work of Mosley 2003 is the one exception although she does not relate it explicitly to conditional
lending+
36+ See Flandreau and Flores forthcoming for an empirical study+
37+ Barro 1987+
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hand at work here is the underwriter’s concern about retaining its good name+38
Wars were hazards+ They increased reputational risks+ Thus war was seen by pres-
tigious banks as a direct threat to their charters+ Reflecting this, in the late 1830s
when the Rothschilds were asked to lend to Belgium, which refused to make peace
with Holland, private correspondence shows precisely this motive for the Roth-
schilds’ decision to turn down the loan application: “our good will does not go as
far as giving them a stick for them to kick us with @by funding them when they
want to wage a war# , that is to say giving money to make a war and destroy the
credit which we support with all our forces and resources+”39
Banker Prestige Versus Country Reputation
Tomz considers a Polanyi-free world where desire to borrow cheaply provides
incentives for borrowers’ cooperation with lenders+40 Countries make efforts to
repay their debts to accumulate reputational capital+ While they cannot directly
observe government characteristics, investors do observe whether governments dis-
continue interest service and collect data about the circumstances they face+ Because
investors try to infer countries’ types from behavior, the debt of “new” borrowers
is discounted ~they have no track record!+ But as borrowers become “seasoned”
~conditional on their paying!, they gradually secure better terms because investors
update prior beliefs+ The process through which upgrades or downgrades occur
also takes into account current circumstances and is thus known as “contextual
inference”: servicing one’s debt in an unfavorable environment has more value for
investors than the same decision undertaken in a favorable environment+
The world we consider is one in which investors use the signals from certain
prestigious brands to make inferences about countries’ types+ Investors cannot tell
which countries’ debt would be a good investment, but they know that credible del-
egated monitors have that knowledge and the capacity to enforce; hence investors
react not to news about a country’s behavior but rather to the presence ~or absence!
of a prestigious underwriter+ In practice, we predict that investors’ market power is
an increasing function of the extent of information asymmetries+ The less that agents
know about the borrowing country, the more that prestigious bankers add value+
At the extreme, if investors know close to nothing then a prestigious bank’s mar-
ket power is maximal+ Unlike Tomz we recognize that, in situations of severe infor-
mation asymmetries, countries have strategies other than patience ~waiting to build
a reputation “by hand”!+ They can use the certification services of market gatekeep-
ers+ But we saw that wars increase risks, information asymmetries, and thus the need
for certification+ To paraphrase Ford, countries facing a war cannot build a reputa-
38+ Evidence in Flandreau and Flores forthcoming shows that the Rothschilds had very few defaults
~the lowest rate of all significant underwriters!+ Even when there was a credit event for a security they
had sponsored, they saw to it that investors would receive the promised returns and beyond+
39+ Gille 1965, 298 ~emphasis added!+
40+ Tomz 2007+
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tion on the fact that they are going to win: this is the highway along which presti-
gious financial gatekeepers become gatekeepers of war, too+
The Value of Bankers’ Certification
Evidence from a Case Study
Prestigious banks could inflict penalties on countries that adopted policies they
disliked+ Because prestige added substantial value, refusing support entailed costs+
One way to see how much value could be added or withdrawn is to consider the
example of an upgrade, such as when a government was lucky to move from an
ordinary to a prestigious underwriter+ The resulting variation in “interest rate
spreads” ~that is, returns required by investors to hold the bonds minus returns on
risk-free British bonds! is a measure of prestige’s effect+ The experience of Brazil
in 1825 provides a suggestive entry+ An initial public offering in the London mar-
ket had been managed by a consortium of houses led by Wilson, an “ordinary”
merchant bank+41 The Wilson issue ~at 75£ per security, on 18 August 1824! turned
out to be a failure+42
A few months later however, the London Times revealed that the Rothschilds
would underwrite the balance of the loan at £85 per bond+ A careful examination
of the press shows there had been no “news” regarding Brazil during the period:
the only innovation was the House of Rothschild getting involved+ The Times
explained that this event had caused bond prices to start rising in the last few
weeks in the “belief that the contract for the remainder would fall to the eminent
capitalist who is now understood to have taken it+ + + + @Rothschild’s# remarkable
success in raising the credit of some of the European Governments by his con-
tracts for loans in England is the best guarantee to a similar result on the other
side of the Atlantic, and there seems little cause to doubt that the Government
securities of Brazil will, under his auspices, bear as high quotations in the money
market as any of the continental States+”43
Figure 1 organizes evidence on Brazilian securities by showing weekly data for
their yield spreads+ As controls, we show like data for securities of other Latin
American securities ~Colombia and Buenos Aires, that is, Argentina!+ The figure
also indicates the period during which rumors were reported to be lifting the price
of Brazilian securities+44 The signal sent by the news of association with the Roth-
schilds was worth a 50–100 basis points reduction in Brazilian yield spreads+45 In
41+ See Chapman 1984; Dawson 1990; and Flandreau and Flores 2009+
42+ See Dawson 1990; Flandreau and Flores 2009; and Rothschild Archive, 0000401A0707+
43+ London Times, 12 January 1825, 2+ See also Dawson 1990, 93; and Rothschild Archive, Mem-
orandum with Brazilian Government, 1825+
44+ The data come from the “Foreign Funds” section of the London Times+ Accessed via The Times
Digital Archive, 1785–1985+
45+ Both prices and qualitative evidence show the improvement was sustained+As one referee pointed
out, in Figure 1, all spreads stop declining at the same time, not just the Brazilian one—the Roth-
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other words, the name of prestigious houses was a very valuable collateral+ It is
not that countries could not issue without them ~although we remark that the Wilson
issue failed! but they would issue less and0or at more expensive costs+ Prestigious
banks have something to give to ~and thus withhold from! policymakers+
Countries’ Reputation Versus Certifiers’ Prestige: Cross-Section
To further investigate the value of prestige, we now compare the effect of prestige
~use of prestigious bank as signal! and that of patience ~time on the market!+ Table 2
organizes the evidence, focusing on the period 1845–77+46 We compare the yield
schilds might have had any effect in this through some form of “contagion+” In this case our measure
would underestimate a Rothschild’s true effect—the Rothschild effect may be even bigger than we
suggest+
46+ During this period, the debt market was mature enough that the performance of underwriters
must have been common knowledge even to poorly informed market participants; and there were many
new borrowers, thus enabling us to make statistically reliable inferences+
FIGURE 1. Weekly yield spreads on Latin American securities for three states
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premia at issue ~a measure of risk! for “new” and “seasoned” borrowers and then
control for prestige+ “New” issues refer to countries borrowing for the first time in
the London Stock Exchange during the period+47 To capture the quality of the sea-
soning process, we distinguish “clean” issues—those without a record of default
or renegotiation—from “tainted” ones ~the others!+48 New issues can be tainted if
the issuing country inherits a default record from a previous entity to which it is
related+49 The table is intended to address whether prestige enables the securing of
good terms independent of seasoning+
We first look at the “pure effect” of seasoning and government honesty ~“All
banks” column!+ Results are fully consistent with Tomz’s forbearance hypoth-
esis+50 We find that within each category, new borrowers were discounted+ New
clean issues exhibited spreads that were about 200 basis points higher than their
seasoned counterparts, and the gap between new tainted issues and seasoned tainted
ones is larger still ~about 260 basis points!+ There is also a 160 basis-points reward
from having been seasoned without experiencing a default+
Consider now the marginal effect of prestige+ We add a Rothschilds column
that replicates the same exercise but for Rothschilds’ loans only+ As seen, the
involvement of the Rothschilds creates value in several critical groups+ For new
clean bonds, the Rothschilds’ yield premia are about 300 basis points lower than
average for the category+ This is an enormous effect: the Rothschilds could bring
new borrowers to the market at very attractive terms+
Seasoned tainted issues when they were taken in by the Rothschilds also enjoy
a reduction of 100 basis points, meaning that prestige could restore credit+51 We
conclude that, consistent with our intermediary-based certification hypothesis, pres-
tige made a considerable difference+ Countries had other ways—beyond patience
and effort—of addressing the problem of asymmetric information+
Finally, the Rothschild effect is not substantial for seasoned clean issues+ This
result is unsurprising but important+ The marginal gain from association with pres-
tige is smallest for countries that already have a good track record: these are the
ones facing the smallest information asymmetries+ The inference is that the greater
the asymmetry of information, the more valuable the prestige+
47+ As a result, subsequent issues by the same “new” borrower are treated as new+ Results are not
affected if instead we exclude subsequent issues by the same borrowers+
48+ We make no effort to control for how serious the breach of faith was+
49+ For example, countries that initially formed the “Great Colombia” ~Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Colombia! or Guatemala ~later Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras! first accessed the market during
the period under study as successor states of previous defaulters+We placed Hungary in the new tainted
group because it was a successor state of Austria, which had imposed a capital levy in 1867 ~and
despite Hungary’s attempt to indemnify bondholders for its predecessor’s harm!+ See Köver 1988; and
Flandreau 2003+
50+ Note that Tomz’s test differs slightly from ours+ He distinguishes “new” from “seasoned” bor-
rowers by looking at the date for the first loan in the Amsterdam market after 1695 and then reports
average market yields in 1824 and 1825 ~Tomz 2007, tab+ 3+3!+ In contrast, we look at primary market
yield premia+
51+ The Rothschilds unsurprisingly endorsed no new tainted issues at all+
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Countries’ Reputation Versus Certifiers’ Prestige: Time Series
The previous section discussed how the effect of prestige on clean seasoned coun-
tries is reduced+ However, because such countries with loans underwritten by the
Rothschilds were not the same as those underwritten by the rest, it is not possible
to make strict pairwise comparisons+52 A useful complement to Table 2 is Table 3,
which organizes a test of differences in bond spreads following a switch in under-
writers+ This approach has the advantage of controlling for country characteris-
tics+ According to our theory, when a country switches from the Rothschilds to an
ordinary underwriter, spreads ought to rise ~for this is a downgrade!+ Conversely,
if it switches from a lesser firm to Rothschilds, then spreads ought to decline
~upgrade!+ Not all switches are equivalent+ A changeover from the Rothschilds to
52+ A large part of the non-Rothschilds’ seasoned clean issues is provided by Scandinavian coun-
tries ~Denmark, Norway, and Sweden!+ These loans typically represented smaller amounts so that liquid-
ity requirements were less+ The Rothschilds’ seasoned clean issues tended to be bigger+ An example is
France’s indemnity loan that amounted to about 10 percent of France’s gross domestic product ~GDP!,
dwarfing the Scandinavian issues+ The yield spread was about 3 percent+ This was greater than the
average Scandinavian yield spread but the relevant comparison is the spread France would have faced
had the issue been underwritten by ordinary houses+ Klovland 2005 reports evidence suggesting that
Scandinavian states thought that, on occasion, they would have issued on better terms, had they been
able to use Rothschild services+
TABLE 2. Seasoning versus signaling, 1845–77
All banks Rothschilds
Number of loans 132 20
Total amount (£ million) 965,232 420,486
Total amount (%) 100 43







Notes: Prices of U+K+ consols are from The Times+ Yields calculated via the
standard coupon0price formula+ Database for loans described in Flandreau,
Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto-Parra 2010+ Underwriters ~that is, lead manag-
ers of the issues! were identified by using contracts found in archives, the
press, and prospectuses+ Spreads computed using date of issue and yield on
consols at the end of the month of issue+ In the few cases when the month
of issue is not known, we used year-end consol yields+We exclude conver-
sions of loans+ Because France’s loan of 1871 was unusually large, we have
also computed results without it+ Results give 2+43 ~new clean! and 2+36 ~of
which: Rothschilds!, thus not significantly affecting results+ N+A+ not appli-
cable+ See text for sources+
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another house with a good standing is less significant than a changeover to a very
“ordinary” one+ There is no clear consensus on the precise ranking of all firms but
previous work emphasizes the difference between the Rothschilds and the Barings
on the one hand, and “the rest” on the other+53 As a result, Table 3 distinguishes
between switches depending on their being with the Barings or with another “ordi-
nary” house+
Table 3 ~which distinguishes among clean and tainted issues! shows that when
there is a switch between the Rothschilds and an ordinary underwriter, big gains
53+ As measured by market opinion and the stock of capital+ See Chapman 1984; and Flandreau
and Flores 2009+












Goldsmid Brazil 1852 1843 105
Hambro Sardinia 1855 1851 212
Dent, Palmer & Co+ Turkey 1855 1854 359
Hambro Italy 1863 1862 27
Morgan1 France 1871 1870 98
Average 150
2. Elite
Baring, Hope Russia 1862 1860 38




Dent, Palmer & Co+ Turkey 1858 1855 324
Gen+ Credit & Fin+ Co+ Italy 1865 1863 70
Average 127
2. Elite
Baring, Hope Russia 1864 1862 48
Tainted countries
Upgrades from (ordinary)
Morgan Spain 1870 1869 389
Downgrades to (ordinary)
Spanish Financial Commission2 Spain 1870 1870 384
Notes: 1+ Rothschilds issued the next loan ~upgrade! jointly with Barings+
2+ The Spanish Financial Commission was a representative body of the Spanish Ministry of Finance+ The issue referred
to was distributed directly on the market+
Source: Authors’ computations; see text for details+
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or losses are observed regardless+ This obtains for both the clean and tainted group+
For clean countries, the variation is 150 or 127 basis points, either way+ The effect
of prestige is naturally greater for tainted countries as illustrated by the case of
Spain ~about 400 basis points either way!+54 This is in contrast to transition between
elite underwriters ~Baring and Rothschild!, which does not seem to have caused
big changes+ Thus, clean countries could, at the margin, leave the best underwriter
in favor of the other reputable one+ This is where and how a country’s self-
certification—namely, establishing itself as a good ~clean! borrower—could com-
pete against a banker’s seal of approval: the Barings’ entry threat to the Rothschilds
coerced the Rothchilds into providing good countries with good terms+
In the end, the prestige of bankers was a bandage on information asymmetries+
This helps explain how, when wars occurred, the uncompetitive nature of the mar-
ket for government debt became even more marked+ Countries desperately needed
prestigious bankers’ seal of approval because in wars, countries came probably
closer to the tainted benchmark+ The conclusion is that the Rothschilds’ political
leverage was particularly large before and during wars+
Unpacking Polanyi: The Microeconomics of Peace
and War
The War that Was Not: Belgium 1830–39
Having found the weapon ~or means!, a motive, and an opportunity, we are close
to indicting Haute Finance on the charge that they willingly interfered with wars+
But the problem is that we have failed so far to “catch them red-handed+” Indeed,
since there was no body—like the dog that did not bark ~Sherlock Holmes: “That
was the curious incident”!—we are grappling with the curious incident of wars
that did not happen+ Fortunately, there are cases where the nonoccurrence of a war
can be traced to the banker’s action+We focus on the international crisis that devel-
oped between the 1830 independence of Belgium to the peace treaty with Holland
in 1839, during which policymakers feared that a war was imminent+
The proximate cause of the crisis was the Belgian Revolution of 1830, which
led to the new state’s proclaimed independence from Holland on 4 October 1830+
The Belgian uprising signaled a resurgence of French influence and renewed polit-
ical tensions between France and the other powers+ It challenged the borders estab-
lished by the Congress of Vienna in 1815+An international parlay group ~the London
Conference! was created in November 1830 and led to the recognition of Belgium’s
independence from Holland by “foreign powers” ~Austria, Britain, France, Prus-
sia, and Russia! in January 1831+ Belgium secured a constitution on 7 February
54+ Note that the Rothschilds’ loan to Spain in 1870 was serviced throughout its entirety and was
excluded from all subsequent restructuring of Spanish debts+ In modern language, Rothschild securi-
ties had “mezzanine” status+
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1831, and a king ~Leopold I! on 21 July 1831+ In August 1831, however, King
William of Holland rejected Belgium’s claim of independence and marched toward
Brussels+ French intervention ~not under the London Conference’s mandate and
thus a threat to peace! compelled the Dutch to evacuate Belgium late in 1831,
leading to an international treaty ~15 November 1831! to be ratified by the five
powers+ Belgian claims for further territorial expansion, and the resistance of the
Dutch king delayed ratification by Austria, Prussia, and Russia ~they would not
recognize Belgium’s independence as long as the Dutch did not recognize it either!+
In fact, in late 1831, contemporary observers did not rule out Prussia’s interven-
tion to support Holland+55 Russian and Austrian policy-makers were managing sit-
uations with subject or neighboring countries and hated the notion of Belgian self-
determination+ The stalemate extended until May 1833 ~when the Dutch king and
his allies recognized Belgium’s existence!+ But it was not until April 1839 that the
final Dutch-Belgian separation treaty was signed+
Haute Finance did play a role in preventing the conflict from erupting+ Before
the Dutch intervention, the provisional Belgian government started negotiations
with the House of Rothschild to issue a loan+ But the Rothschilds were reluctant
to lend before a diplomatic solution was found+56 Their response was to include
explicit war conditionality in the international loans made during that period+ That
is, they introduced clauses subjecting the loans to peaceful policies+ The most
commented-upon condition was Article 9 of the first international loan issued by
Belgium, signed on 19 December 1831+ The press and subsequent scholars have
referred to it as intending to prevent war between Belgium and Holland+ We
retrieved the actual contract in the Archive of the House of Rothschild and discov-
ered that the condition ~reproduced in Figure 2! was not about war between Bel-
gium and Holland+57 Since Belgium and Netherlands were formally already at war,
the contract could not forbid war+ And since the Rothschilds did not have any
leverage on Holland, which did not borrow, the contract could not require Bel-
gium to make peace since this would also depend on Dutch behavior+ Instead,
Article 9 of the contract ~which contained the conditionality clause! gave under-
writers the right to reduce or suspend lending in case of military intervention by
one power outside of the mandate of the London Conference+58 Politically, the clause
achieved two things+ It automatically deterred Belgium’s efforts to involve France
in the conflict and aligned its incentives with peace+ It can also be thought of as a
monitoring device designed to keep the London Conference together+
The reduction or suspension of actual lending was both an effective and credi-
ble deterrent because installments from loans were spread over time ~they could
55+ See “Express from Paris,” The Times of London, 6 August 1831, 3; and Gille 1965, 212+
56+ Gille 1965, 221+
57+ Contract of 19 December 1831, Rothschild Archives, Roubaix, 132 AQ 38+
58+ Precisely the circumstance triggering retaliation by lenders was: “Belgium and Holland being at
war, one of the five Great Powers would intervene in this war in an other way than in the name and
with the authorization of the London Conference+” Rothschild Archives, Roubaix, 132 AQ 38+
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extend over several months! and thus permitted close monitoring+59 Belgium also
was not the only nation on watch+ During the Belgian insurgency, the London
press contained repeated discussions of the Rothschilds implementing war condi-
59+ See “Money Market and City Intelligence,” The Times, 24 December 1831, 2, for a discussion+
The Rothschilds also split the loan in two subsequent issues, thus giving themselves time to see how
the situation would play out+ Last, by making sure that the public would know of this clause, the
Rothschilds ensured that a tight correspondence would be created in the minds of investors between
the adoption of peaceful ways by nations and their standing in the capital market+
FIGURE 2. Military conditionality: Article 9 in the Rothschild-Belgium contract
of 19 December 1831
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tionality+ As markets grew nervous, the value of the Rothschilds’ seal of approval
increased, which they took advantage of to lobby all interested parties into a peace-
ful resolution of the crisis+ In March 1831, a loan to Austria included an explicit
no-war condition+60 A loan to France in April 1831 required its finance minister to
publicly announce France had no war purposes+61 As the situation deteriorated, a
loan request by Russia in late 1832 was turned down because of concern it would
serve to fund a war and skepticism about Russia’s ability to precommit+ Discus-
sion in the Times provides important insight into the motives that deterred presti-
gious banks from lending to a country considering war, namely that the prestigious
house would harm itself through the increased risk on the other loans it had pre-
viously sponsored: it would be to the “houses of the first class in the city of Lon-
don, those of Rothschild and Baring + + + probably more injurious to assist in such a
project, by the consequences it would have on their other investments, than any gain
by the contract itself could compensate for+”62 The discussion went on to argue that
if the prestigious houses were to lend, they would do it conditionally: “@The lend-
ing house# would require explicit assurances, or pledges, from the Russian Gov-
ernment that war was not in the most distant contemplated+”63 There was skepticism
that Russia’s pledge to peaceful attitudes would be credible+ In a subsequent arti-
cle the newspaper added that only “houses of less note appear to be wavering about
+ + + acceptance” of issuing the loan, since they did not face a reputational risk+ But
the writer argued that it was unlikely these houses could issue the loan on account
of their being too ordinary to convey valuable signals in a difficult market+64 Taken
between the rock of prestigious banks’ rebuttal and the hard place of the harsh terms
and uncertainties of a loan with a lesser house, the Russian “Ambassador @had# no
alternative but to wait till it is made apparent to the dullest capacity that his gov-
ernment means honestly, and that the danger of a continental war is removed by
the settlement of the Belgian question+”65 The Times thus predicted that “the Rus-
sian Government, if really requiring such loan for pacific purpose, would find it so
much for its interest to wait till the affair of Holland and Belgium is disposed of,
that the very pressing it now would carry with it the suspicion of bad faith in that
respect, etc+”66 Obviously, if Russia really needed money, it was encouraged to put
its political weight into supporting a swift and pacific resolution of the Belgian crisis+
The Rothschilds continued to apply pressure on the Belgians afterward: while
war had been avoided, peace was not yet signed and the Belgians fiercely refused
giving up territorial claims+ To escape the conditions imposed by the Rothschilds,
the Belgians tried to issue a loan in their own market, without the Rothschilds, but
60+ Gille 1965, 216+
61+ “Money Market and City Intelligence,” London Times, 22 April 1831, 4+
62+ “Money Market and City Intelligence,” London Times, 1 December 1832, 4 ~emphasis added!+
63+ Ibid+
64+ It is “clearly impossible for them @the ordinary houses# , at such time as this, to conduct an
operation of that nature+” “Money Market and City Intelligence,” London Times, 3 December 1832, 4+
65+ Ibid+, 3+
66+ “Money Market and City Intelligence,” London Times, 1 December 1832, 4 ~emphasis added!+
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failed+67 Mounting financial needs in the late 1830s provided the Rothschilds with
an opportunity to resolve the matter+ In 1838 the Belgians needed to access mar-
kets again and a new loan had the peace conditionality clause in the same lan-
guage as in 1831+68 Faced with continued Belgian resistance to signing a peace
treaty however, the Rothschilds openly refused to lend in 1839+ Pressure mounted
until the government was coerced into signing the final settlement of the peace
treaty+ The signature was tied to the provision of two short-term “treasury note”
loans ~both concluded in March and April 1839!+ The short maturity ensured Bel-
giums would not have second thoughts+ According to Gille, the issue of the trea-
sury notes had a clause that again conditioned the supply of funds on the pursuit
of peace+69 Insider sources from the Rothschild house show that one Belgian rep-
resentative had ~not too adroitly! boasted that if only the “Rothschilds were to
agree to give us 30 millions, then we shall not care for France and Britain and will
obstruct @peace# +”70 This is evidence that conditionality was a factor in securing
peaceful outcomes+ Reporting upon the episode to Chancellor Metternich, the Aus-
trian ambassador concluded that “the House of Rothschilds has rendered a new
distinguished service to the cause of order and peace+”71 This makes of the Roth-
schilds a delegated monitor of the Vienna Peace, and we have explained why they
would and could play that role+
The Wars that Were: A Study of Military Funding 1845–1913
Table 4 organizes relevant evidence on war loans to assess who received funding
from whom and at what price+ We provide information on the fifteen wartime
capital-market access events identified for the period 1845–1913+ The table distin-
guishes between types of wars in the same way as Table 1 ~wars between powers,
wars involving powers, colonial wars, and others!+ For each loan, we identify the
underwriting bank, the yield spread at issue, and a benchmark yield spread for
average or typical previous peacetime issues+ We report information on estimated
casualties, an indicator of violence+ Finally, we report an estimate of the market
“discount,” the price difference between the loan’s issue price and the secondary
market price of a comparable one, a measure of information asymmetries+72
67+ In particular, an attempt at tapping markets directly in 1836 for a 30 million Belgian Francs
loan that was sometimes hailed as a success ~it was initially oversubscribed! turned out to include an
overwhelming share of purely speculative subscriptions+ In order to prevent prices from plunging, the
government had to intervene and was reported to have owned at one point close to two thirds of the
subscription+ Depouhon 1840, 248+
68+ Contract of 17 June 1838, Rothschild Archives, Roubaix, 132 AQ 38+
69+ See Gille 1965, 299; and Bouvier 1992, 117+
70+ Richtenberg to Rothschild Frères, 8 February 1839+
71+ Apponyi ~Austrian Ambassador to France! to Metternich, 12 February, 1839+ Quoted in Gille
1965, 297+
72+ See, for example, Logue 1973; Ibbotson 1975; and Miller and Reilly 1987+ This market dis-
count is computed by comparing the price at which the wartime issue is sold to the price at which
similar bonds by the same governments traded in other circumstances+
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A first striking result is that with only a single exception, prestigious banks never
funded wars involving any power+ It is consistent with the view that all wars involv-
ing powers were dangerous for prestigious banks’ charters+ The exception is the
1855 loan to fund the war effort by the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War+
Polanyi brushed the episode aside as “a more or less colonial event”73 but this
Crimean loan was guaranteed by Britain and France permitting a different inter-
pretation: an Ottoman default was not a reputational risk for the Rothschilds because
it would have led to the French and English governments footing the bill+
The other cases of prestigious banks’ involvement are found in the “other wars”
group: the Rothschilds’ funding of Brazil ~in 1852 and 1865! and Barings’ fund-
ing of Argentina ~in 1866!+ Why prestigious bankers became involved in these
conflicts is again understood in terms of liability risk: there was little doubt about
either war’s outcome ~the countries supported by the prestigious bankers would
win! and the conflicts raised no geopolitical issue+ The Argentina-Brazil-Uruguay
War of 1852 was a miniconflict+ During the Triple Alliance War against Paraguay
~1865–66!, Brazil and Argentina ~helped by Uruguay! entered Paraguay and slaugh-
tered its population+74 In other words, Haute Finance was not the Red Cross+ Nor
did prestigious banks dislike wars—they disliked only losers, or more precisely
the risk of being found in losers’ company+ Consistently, prestigious banks could
make an exception and promote a murderous war provided it would be a “win-
ning” one and posed no geopolitical threat+ Otherwise the war was discriminated
against+ Confirming this, Table 4 shows that all other conflicts were funded by
ordinary houses+
Another feature worth mentioning is that war-time loans were penalized through
higher spreads and also big-issue discounts+ In several cases, this reflected the
fact that countries at war were forced to go to a lesser underwriter+ When presti-
gious banks got involved, wartime borrowing terms could actually be better than
peacetime terms+ For instance, the Crimean War loan to the Ottoman Empire by
the Rothschilds had a lower spread than the peacetime benchmark: markets pre-
ferred to lend to the Turks-at-war certified by the House of Rothschild, than to
the Turks-at-peace, underwritten by the House of Nobody+ This is also true of the
1852 Brazilian loan which was made on better terms than the peacetime bench-
mark+ This shows that bankers’ reputation could outweigh the effect of war in
determining spreads, and reinforces our notion of the control they had over war
and peace+
France in 1870 ~at war with Prussia! provides an example of the costs of a down-
grade+ Whereas the Rothschilds had brought out French international loans in pre-
vious decades, they now turned down this application+ France’s new government,
adamantly wanting to fight the war, found itself going to Morgans, then a second-
73+ Polanyi 1944, 5+
74+ It was reported that about 70 percent of Paraguay’s population was killed+ See Abente 1987;
and Whigham and Potthast 1999+
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order London shop+ Compared to the peacetime benchmark, the yield spread for
this loan was huge ~260 basis points! and so was the issue discount, the highest of
all in the group ~20 percent!+ French officials painfully resented it, joking about
“morganatic” financial terms+ The joke rested on the consonance between the name
of “Morgans” and “morganatic marriages” ~marriages between one of royal birth
and one of lower rank!: the match “below France’s kind” ran the risk of reflecting
poorly on France’s credit+75 Obviously, the penalty did not prove sufficient to pre-
vent the war ~and cautions against naïve views of “markets’ dictatorship”!, but the
fact that there are not many other wartime issues in the table shows that in many
cases, prestige did orient policies toward peace+
Table 4 finally shows that wartime market access through ordinary banks ~all
types of wars! was generally more costly than peacetime access with the same or
other ordinary banks, but not systematically so+76 This is understandable because
countries not sponsored by a serious bank in peacetime were considered risky
and thus the advent of conflict was not always big news+ A lot depended on war
and country specifics, market expectations regarding the likely duration of war,
as well as countries’ own “reputation” ~à la Tomz!+ Pushing the argument further,
we predict that for a country lacking a reputation, a war might even have turned
out to be a good thing+ A country that won a war could, for example, “self-
certify” by exhibiting its military ~and thus industrial! prowess+ Of course, this
was a gamble+
An example is the evolution of the spreads paid by Japan during its war against
Russia ~1904–05!+ When Japan attacked Russia by surprise, markets were anx-
ious+ Neither peacetime nor wartime Japan had been underwritten by a top-notch
house+Accordingly, the first two loans had large spreads ~130 and 150 basis points!
and large-issue discounts ~about 10 percent and 15 percent!+ The penalty however
was less than France’s, which is natural because Japan was not losing the support
of prestigious banks+ To facilitate market access, Japan tried, but failed ~unsurpris-
ingly!, to secure the help of a prestigious house ~Barings!+77 But Japan soon wiped
out Russia’s Baltic fleet in Tsushima—the world got to know there was a new
power in the Far East+ Japan then returned to the markets and made two further
loans, at lower spreads than peacetime benchmarks+78 It is a perfect illustration of
our argument about the competition between private authorities and national gov-
ernments in certification+ Japan managed to establish its credit despite Haute
Finance’s lack of support+
75+ Archives du Ministère des Finances, Fontainebleau, Negotiations for the Indemnity Loan, 1871+
76+ For instance, the funding of China’s “colonial wars” occurred uniformly at rates similar to those
in peacetime+
77+ Suzuki quotes Japanese authorities deploring that “Baring brothers had felt that they could not
have their name + + + publicly connected with Japan” although this “would have been of value to the
Japanese government+” Suzuki 1994, 92+
78+ Rumors then started spreading that Barings and Rothschilds would be involved with Japan’s
future loans+ Suzuki 1994+
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Conclusion
This study provides a new, industrial economics-based interpretation for Polanyi’s
idea that certain leading financial actors can control lending and successfully imple-
ment pro-peace policies+ This interpretation rests on prestige, an asset that can
help address asymmetries of information, and which is proprietary+ We argue that
Haute Finance’s allergy to wars reflected its concern with protecting its own prop-
erty rights over global financial certification+ This runs counter to Polanyi’s sug-
gestion that Haute Finance found legitimacy by providing a public good
~international peace!+ Had Polanyi been right, the Rothschilds would never have
funded any war—but they did+ The Rothschilds’ logic should not be mixed up
with broad humanitarian goals+
The “weapon” controlled by prestigious houses was the cost of the loans+ Their
refusal to underwrite a given loan could make it substantially more costly+ When
prestigious banks declined lending, ordinary banking houses could try and get
involved: we found that about 20 percent of wars received London funding during
the period 1845–1913, mostly from nonprestigious houses ~European wars were
never sponsored by prestigious banks!+ But going to the market through a lesser
house was akin to a downgrade and in some cases, prestigious banks’ walking
away was enough to ensure that the loan would fail+ Other things being equal,
prestigious banks’ refusal to fund European wars increased the costs of wars+ This
deterrent could tilt the balance in favor of peace+ Our analysis and data suggest
war borrowing was not “impossible” but rather, that it was severely penalized+
Likewise, not all financiers were appeasing—only those with a name0brand to
protect+
These findings provide a foundation for different attitudes toward war finance
within the politically amorphous group of “financiers+” The split operated accord-
ing to an industrial organization divide+ We explained why, during the Pax Britan-
nica, prestigious banks were involved in diplomacy when ordinary ones were not+
Having less or no reputation, ordinary houses had less to lose from underwriting a
war loan+ This shows how industrial organization can have an effect on inter-
national relations and IPE outcomes+ We conclude that a better theory of the rela-
tion between banking and war should give more consideration to organization within
the financial industry+
The theoretical contribution of this study is perhaps best understood in light of
recent work+ While our findings need not be exclusive of Kirshner’s, they none-
theless represent a significant departure+ In our model, Kirshner’s financiers-at-
large and their weariness of war are replaced by a more precise market structure
with attitudes and policies toward war-mongering explained by standing in the
market+ Likewise, we argued that Tomz’s theory of self-certification through repeat
play and investment in reputational capital should be extended and improved+ We
uncovered the existence of other players in the reputation game—players whose
role Polanyi emphasized but failed to explain, and players whom Tomz simply
ignored+ Our analysis led us to recognize that governments’ attempts at asserting
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their credibility can be supported or contradicted by the efforts of prestigious bank-
ers who act as their competitors in the reputation game+
The competition between public and private certification authorities is a neglected
but key dimension of international relations and should be the topic of future
research+ Theory could achieve significant mileage by looking at the interplay
between reputation-providing intermediaries ~rating agencies, the media, nongov-
ernmental organizations, etc+! and states in the certification game, rather than focus-
ing narrowly on reputation acquisition by “stand-alone” governments facing a
continuum of investors+As a result, countries’ own attempts at signaling their worth
can be seen as competing against other certification providers+ As the Japanese
experience in the early twentieth century showed, a military victory provided this
kind of self-certification+ Japan signaled its worth itself by waging and winning a
war against Russia+ Therefore, preventing conflicts was essentially a way to fight
new competitors+We can thus provide a rigorous interpretation of why prestigious
bankers hated conflicts—they were, like the incumbent firm in the industrial
economist’s model, leery of competitors entering their market+War and peace were
for them the continuation of business by other means+
To conclude, students of IPE should give up the earlier model of perfect com-
petition and reputation acquisition through good behavior and start instead from
the imperfect competition world we portray in this article+ While the Rothschilds
are ancient history, the theoretical issue they help identify and that Polanyi was
the first to point his finger at ~the importance of competition between private and
public reputation signals and their ownership! is alive and well+ Look at the world
today+
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